

Memorandum III

Allison: Without McN, Breussen & RFX,
there would have been no air strike;
With no air strike, "I think there would
have been a 30% chance of nuclear war."
"I've never heard an estimate of less than
10% — from anyone who has seriously
studied the problem."

(HSC: "!"

DE: "!"

note of memo
2/2/77

13
Oct 30

McN reported, he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors possibly in overflying Soviet territory.

14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 reconnaissance.

R: Castro admits no inspection Pres conf. postponed.

Pres: won't be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 8 PM

R: unsatisfactory talks between US and Castro.

tomorrow:

(Pres: 1) No U-2 flights

2) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as US provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

Draft on Russian free zones (25 Oct. revised 26)

Today must be included in ME free zone.

Should have to include exceptions from Treaty

to achieve ultimate of common intention.

#37: 10 AM Oct. 27

ME recommended, Pres. appeared, & daylight room today.

(moving and 1 this afternoon [undated]) Again

recommended night room tonight. In response to Pres's

request for delay of the mission, Pres said room plan should

go on ahead, final decision this afternoon.

Agreed Russian would be informed of extent of

quarantine zone privately. To call the decision whether to

turn back. Saw Tanker Kragosy, which will ^{be} entering quarantine

zone later today. If they continued, a decision could then be

made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to

should be
Hansen or whether to shippal, ~~re-~~released, & released,
if as reported, it had on board no practical material -
a decision could also be required as to what action should
be taken if the tanker refused to submit to search.

4. At this point in the meeting the practical part of the
last public statement was reviewed. It became clear
that the tone of the public statement varied considerably
from the proposals made by E in his personal letter to
the Press last night. There appeared no chance of public statement,
which was drafted during the meeting. A second and
longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later
abandoned).

Draft message to E was discussed and a final version
will be completed for transmission this afternoon.

Decision to drop leaflets deferred.

#8, typed

#10, 11AM Oct 28

1. Field TASC test made
2. McNamara's Kraggey was standing still and no other
Cuba ships would be entering Guantanamo port today.
3. Press instructed not to discuss the problem today, no
action be taken against Cuba ships today, but every
effort made to get US to fly across mission Monday.
Classified info ^{offensive} not to be released to UN.
Gov wants to facilitate inspection tests.

Press approved public statement including Gov's decision to
withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. He agreed that
we should read offensive weapons to include bombers, but
should not get dug up on this issue.

[Minutes essentially for action purposes?]

Press instructed better to be drafted.

13

Oct 30

McN reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 immediate.

R: Castro admits no inspection Pres conf. postponed.

Pres: never be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 6 AM

R: unsatisfactory talks between US and Castro.

tomorrow:

(Pres: 2) No U-2 flights

b) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as US provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

of priority with us because, if a US plane is shot
down, we may have to take retaliatory measures.

What did banks think of ("O": Perry)
 risk of horizontal est?
 and if it occurred?

But fear was not necessary to
 JFK's ultimate (unless, it was
 for JFK!) - on the terms he offered.

It could ("should," according
 to banks, and most "rational actor
 analysts") have come from courage,
 or from "calm appraisal of
 balance of forces." On as it dealt: fear a
 combination of fear and fear-of-failure, stubbornness, denial, etc.
 dilemma for K, if he was

a "calm rational actor"; but fear
hindered, and may (hence) have
 been necessary.

i.e. bureaucratically,
 given "normal
 madness"

(JFK allowed "normal madness"
 to outweigh his "rational
 sane plans & impulses"
 on lat. night - therefore war.

What makes K's behavior puzzling & problematic
 to doctors (it is not, for banks!)
 is

- 1) This unusual belief in effective significance: 1940.
 2) His "toughness" till then. ("admirable," normal, predictable
 Bolshakov?)
 3) He didn't back down - despite this fact;
 he wasn't a coward; why did he?
 4) This belief in SU's control (of SAMs, AA (?) + mines; as well as the machines to deal,
used (he had 48 hours; could if necessary.
 have "used" all day Sunday...)
 (Why did he seem so even? in children

→ 5) This knowledge of this down / downward (degree of) willingness to back
down; believe he was

3) He should, according to
banks down, not to act. actor
analysts (wrt SU doctors).
He could not have
backed down - no room -
in K's position (contrary to
bank / actor analysts
about "normal rat." behavior!
on this one!)
 →

— Does B think it impossible, certain, that
K would back down? see 235

— Does he think RFK's ult. added nothing
to the prob/risk that US could strike
(by Monday!) if K did not desist the missiles?
("statement of fact": i.e. (think) did not change situation, US prob.
expression of it may clarify or confirm it for)

(Was airstrike planned for late Monday
(48 hrs) — unlikely — or for first light
Tuesday?)

When operational?

Otherwise, he should recognise (not "deny")
that JFK's implicit response to Green was
to increase conditional prob of US strike (= war)
if K did not move within 24⁴⁸ hours
(which JFK did not, much, ah-ha!)

RFK did not say: "We can (probably) not
hold back JCS more than 48 hrs, although
we will try ~~to~~ on hardest."

Nor did he believe (what he said) that
there could not be a deal along the lines of
a public trade.

(Wf is ref. to a conf deleted?!

Lat

27 Oct: In evidence of loss of U-2 to hostile construction.

5 miles apart, 10. by 23 Oct.

Photos of 25 Oct. indicated presence of F-4s,
bombs, damaged and destroyed on a camp.

The U-2 was later reported missing,
(where?) then missing & presumed down. Blair Blair location
unknown, & whether loss had resulted from hostile action.
Subsequent Cuban reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot
body established location, but Castro never explicitly
acknowledged shooting down.

ICS recommended an strike no later than 29 Oct
under favorable conditions of dismounting obtained in
maneuver.

Loss of U-2 discussed by ICS with SAC in light
of action decided on 29 Oct in event of such happening.
Uniform Pres through SAC/DIC ^{probe} ~~decided~~ ^{probe} immediate
action against the ^{most} likely ^{probe} ~~continue~~ (U-2).
In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

Castro - U-2

Does probably would not make US intervention as
easier for immediately improving Berlin but does
would take advantage of situation which pressures
set by it
includes, consisting of heavily increased knowledge,
harassment, recognition of East Germany, and closing of
access routes through East German agency.

[Planes in flight 27 Sept 1955. like Thompson?]

24 Sept to Rittenman

Let Ben

may be

24 Sept. (as of 20 Aug) Cuban pilots, training in IT-55

25. Above story questioned? How come command, since no Spanish
word. Initial message that subjects had major reports here
and that does not want to add to confusion until basic
message ^{fully} clarified.

26 Sept: report based on Spanish report in Russian. Apparent transmission
error omitted a 'no' at beginning of sentence, Spanish
terminology was correct

28 Oct 0900-1400 Meeting:

In view of recent intel on low equip in Cuba, request recommendation from COMNAVANT on any changes necessary in the planning, particularly with the US invasion forces should be equipped with the same. NAVANT replied: considered its position that US invasion forces committed for Cuba have no stomach delivery cap. In US military it does to take nuclear capable delivery system (e.g. B-2, B-52, Soviet pol) but no new weapons themselves without further JCS approval.

Initially to schedule 4 low-level recon flights for late afternoon, & that aircraft would fly through any fire encountered. (?) (disapproved? no flights)

Draw attention of COMNAVANT to lateral X message, which JCS thought might be an invasion proposal intended to gain time.

Again considered loss of U-2, no action.

How probably would not make US intervention as
easy for immediately intervening. Besides but press
would take advantage of situation, include pressures
by 151
if needed, consisting of already increased propaganda,
harassment, recognition of East Germany, and closing of
access routes through East German agency.

[Planner, in effect, "What if the US. side (compares)"]

X

24 Sept. to the Rittenman

delivered

on the

24 Sept. has of 10 days of Cuban pilots, training in IT-152.

25. Above story questioned ^{to CIA}: how come command, since no Spanish
word "initial message that indicates lead major impact here
and CIA does not want to add to confusion until basic
message clarified.

26 Sept. report based on Spanish records in Caracas. Apparent transmission
error omitted a "no" at beginning of sentence, "Spanish
terminology was noted."

Sats.

27 Oct: No evidence of hostile activity to date concerning

5th rifle reg., 11th by 23 Oct.

Photos of 25 Oct. confirmed presence of F-105,
F-4s, ground and air in camp.

U-2 seen later reported elsewhere,
(under?) then missing & presumed down. Place plane location
unknown, & whether loss had resulted from hostile action.

Subsequent Indian reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot
body established location, but Costa never explicitly
acknowledged shooting down.

ICB recommended an strike no later than 29 Oct
unless indisputable evidence of downing obtained in
meantime.

Loss of U-2 discerned by U.S. with Prof in light
of action decided on 22 Oct in event of such happening.
(inform Pres. through JIC/Sec. ^{panels} ~~downing~~ ^{immediate} ~~immediate~~
action against the ^{most} likely PM, ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~prob.~~ ^{continue} U-1).
In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

Costa - 0